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Abstract 
Institutional identity: a possible solution to the religion in/and 
education quandary  
The problem of religion in/and education is a worldwide one for 
education policy-makers – even in the most homogeneous 
populations. Several strategies have been developed for coping 
with this problem, but they tend to fall short in terms of finding 
equilibrium on the universal-particularity continuum. There is a 
way for attaining the desired equilibrium, namely to take 
account of the institutional identity of each individual school, 
and to allow each school community the freedom to choose the 
type of religion education that would be most suitable to its 
particular needs and circumstances. 
Opsomming 
Institusionele identiteit: ’n moontlike oplossing vir die 
godsdiens in/en onderwys-dilemma 
Wêreldwyd het onderwysbeleidmakers te doen met die vraag-
stuk van godsdiens in/en die onderwys – selfs in die mees 
homogene samelewings. Verskeie strategieë is al in die verlede 
bedink om die probleem die hoof te bied, maar hulle skiet almal 
te kort in terme daarvan om ’n ewewig op die universeel-
partikulier-kontinuum te vind. Daar is egter nog ’n manier om 
die gewenste balans op die kontinuum te vind, naamlik deur 
met die gedagte van die institusionele identiteit van elke skool 
te werk, en om op grond daarvan elke skoolgemeenskap die 
vryheid te gun om die soort godsdiensonderwys te kies wat die 
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beste sal voldoen aan sy eie besondere behoeftes en omstan-
dighede.  
1. The problem 
All systems of education find themselves confronted with the pro-
blem of whether or not to offer confessional religious education to 
learners in public or state-funded schools, or only education about 
religion/the different world religions. A survey of the World Factbook 
(2008; cf. also Anon., 2002; Vilar, 2005; Goodstein, 2005) shows 
that even the most religiously homogeneous countries have to deal 
with the problem of religious diversity (cf. Hagesaeter & Sandsmark, 
2006:277). How can policy-makers cope with religious diversity in a 
particular school or classroom without causing tension or violating 
citizens’ fundamental rights? This problem statement can be broken 
down into a host of questions.   
Can one overcome the problem with only one religion subject in 
schools? Can the solution be found in teaching only sets of religious 
dogmas or intellectual facts, shorn of all religious cult or activities 
(i.e. not as personal, confessional faith or sets of beliefs)? Should 
one attempt to smooth over the differences and concentrate only on 
those features shared in some or other way by all religions in order 
to promote tolerance, deeper understanding of others and their dif-
ferences? Or does one rather accentuate the differences in the 
expectation that once learners gain insight into the uniqueness of 
their own religion/faith, they will develop greater understanding and 
tolerance of others and their particular religious uniqueness, and in 
doing so learn to enjoy the diversity (Jansen, 2008:16)? Why, in 
spite of all the efforts of education authorities (departments of 
education/administrations) all over the world to promote understand-
ing, tolerance and peaceful coexistence, are we still confronted with 
religious exclusivism, disrespect, stereotyping and persecution, with 
xenophobia and contempt for others based on religious and other 
cultural differences, with religious discrimination, prejudice, intole-
rance, misunderstandings and violence, and with propaganda a-
gainst other religions/faiths? 
Should we allow confessional religious education in state-funded 
schools or not? Does the policy of exempting dissenting learners 
from confessional, sectarian education not constitute a violation of 
their constitutional (human) rights? Should we allow religious values 
and sentiments to influence public life via the public school? Does 
the total abolishment of religion from school premises not constitute 
a violation of parents’ rights to have their children taught in the faith 
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of their choice? Does abolishment not mean encroachment by the 
state on the sovereign competency sphere of the school? Does this 
not lead to dualisms, such as private-public, home-school, sacred-
secular, confessional-secular? Can such dualisms be ontologically 
defended?  
Should we rather look for the solution in comparative, interfaith, 
inter- or multi-religion education? Is there any justification for only 
teaching (comparative, etc.) religion education and allowing religious 
observances in public schools, but not religious (confessional, sec-
tarian) education? Does such an artificial distinction not lead to 
religious schizophrenia in learners? Or should we look at interna-
tional organisations and their charters to come up with a solution, as 
suggested by Høstmaelingen (2005:409)? 
Is secularism (humanism) indeed the best approach to the problem? 
Can we have faith in authorities who offer toleration, and argue that 
they do not promote secularism or a secular state, because they do 
not support any hostility between state and church, between school-
ing/teaching and religion (provided that only religion education, i.e. 
education about religion(s), is included in the curriculum), and do not 
use the pulpit or church (etc.) funds to support political candidates or 
promote values that would affect the state or government? Are 
sectarian religious influences indeed harmful to public life, as Rorty 
(2003:141) averred? 
After presenting a discussion of some key concepts, several strate-
gies for dealing with the problem will be discussed. In doing so, 
several sets of evidence, including expert opinions, legal judge-
ments and empirical findings will be offered. It will be contended that 
none of the current solutions to the problem can be effective, 
because of their inherent failure to meet the requirements of a basic 
ontological law, namely the need to attain balance on the universal-
particular continuum. After discussing this shortcoming, the article 
will be concluded by offering an alternative approach that revolves 
around the concept of the institutional identity of schools. 
2. Some key concepts 
Along with the compilers of the South African National Policy on 
Religion and Education (2003), I distinguish between religious in-
struction, religion education and religious observances. Religious 
instruction refers to education for the purpose of inculcating a parti-
cular faith or sectarian religious tenets in learners (RSA, 2003: sec-
tion 54). This is a confessional (sectarian, denominational) form of 
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education. Because of its particularity, it excludes the teaching of 
any other religion or faith. Religion education refers to the teaching 
of religion as a phenomenon. This is a non-confessional, scientific, 
academic, supposedly neutral, generic and general approach that 
focuses on the universal traits that all religions supposedly share (cf. 
Abdool et al., 2007:545-547 for a discussion of such traits; cf. also 
RSA, 2003:section 17 ff.). Religious observances refers to the cultic 
or ceremonial practices or services associated with the different 
religions observed by the learners in a school such as prayer, 
singing of sacred songs, recitals and reading from holy Scriptures 
(RSA, 2003: section 58 ff.).  
Religious institutions in this discussion refers to institutions such as 
churches, mosques, synagogues, temples, shrines; special places 
for worshipping a deity or for cultic practices. Occasionally referen-
ces to “churches (etc.)” will be used as a correlative to “religious 
institutions”. The author finds Rorty’s (2003:141) term “ecclesiastical 
organizations” restrictive, since ecclesia refers to the Christian 
church, and not to other religious institutions such as the mosque or 
the synagogue. 
Secularism refers to the view that religion, religious values and con-
siderations and also religious institutions should play no role in 
public affairs (Van der Walt, 2007:228), and that the latter should not 
strive to acquire economic or political clout (Rorty, 2003:141). This is 
not an imaginary problem as can be seen in the Irish Republic up to 
the 1970s where the influence of the Catholic Church was 
“pervasive on all levels of thinking” (English, 2007:323).  
Secular humanism extends the secularist view. It holds that in a 
secular state or society the interests of human beings, the citizens, 
should be pivotal and not those of a divine or transcendent force. 
Many secular humanists adhere to the utilitarian, pragmatic and 
libertarian Benthamite principle of the maximum feasible benefit for 
the maximum possible number rather than to any religious principle 
(English, 2007:136; Rorty, 2003:148). If religion should disappear, 
as Rorty (2003:142) hopes will happen, the gap will be filled by “a(n) 
increased sense of participation in the advance of humanity … 
toward the fulfilment of social ideals” and the attainment of social 
justice. Nothing, not even religion or quotes from the Bible or the 
Q’uran, should stand in the way of the utilitarian promotion of public 
interests (Rorty, 2003:143 ff.). In brief, says Rorty (2003:144), “if we 
secular humanists have our way, the liberal democracies will 
eventually mutate into societies whose most sacred texts were 
written by John Stuart Mill”. Positions taken in public life should be 
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substantiated with good reasons and not merely based on appeal to 
some or other authority, Scriptural or otherwise (Rorty, 2003:147, 
149; cf. also Woolfenden, 2008:5). 
Institutional identity refers to how stakeholders in a school under-
stand and describe the particular institutional life-conceptual, philo-
sophical and/or religious character of their school. In the last part of 
this article, institutional identity will be connected to the ontological 
problem of equilibrium-seeking on the universal-particular continuum 
as well as to a possible solution to the religion in/and education 
problem. 
Fukuyama (1996:26-27) provides us with a pithy definition of social 
capital: it is the accumulated social wealth that arises from the pre-
valence of trust in a society or certain parts of it. It differs from other 
forms of capital in that it is usually created and transmitted through 
cultural mechanisms like religion, tradition, or historical habit. Ac-
quisition of social capital requires habituation to the moral norms of 
a community (cf. also Van der Walt, 2009). 
Having set the stage for a discussion of the problem of religion in 
education, I shall now proceed to a discussion of the forms that the 
so-called religion in/and education problem can assume.  
3. The different forms of the religion in/and education 
problem 
The first and most obvious form in which the problem manifests 
itself, is the choice between offering or allowing religious instruction 
in a state or public school, and offering or allowing only religion 
education. Put differently: should a state or publicly funded school 
offer or allow education of a particular religion, or only teaching 
about religion(s) in general? Those in favour of the first view argue 
that the anthropological integrity of learners should not be compro-
mised in any way, that there should be no rupture in a learner’s 
religious or faith education. Those in favour of the second view use 
the secularist argument that states and institutions such as publicly 
funded schools may not be abused for the promotion of confes-
sional, sectarian or private values. The promotion of religious values 
is the task of the parental home and/or religious institution. 
The problem as outlined above forms part of a larger problem, 
namely the conservative right versus the liberal/secular/atheist left 
controversy (cf. The Pew Forum, 2008). This is sometimes referred 
to as the “wall of separation between state and religious institutions” 
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controversy. Williams (2005) referred to this thorny issue as the 
“First Amendment ban on the establishment of religion” in the public 
or state sphere. The problem revolves around the relationship be-
tween religious institutions and the state (government), and the 
degree to which the sectarian views of different religious institutions 
should be allowed to influence the public sphere of the state and its 
affairs. Secularists regard education as essential to the forging of 
the good national citizen. If a nation has to be built across confes-
sional divides, then denominationally divided education would be 
disastrous for those who seek to produce a shared communal iden-
tity and national purpose (English, 2007:149). Rorty was a famous 
exponent of this position. In Rorty’s (2003:141) opinion, the exclu-
sion of religious convictions from the public square “was part of a 
reasonable compromise between secular democratic governments 
and ecclesiastical organizations”. Rorty (2003:148) illustrates the 
“wall of separation” philosophy with reference to the attitude of John 
F. Kennedy. While remaining a professing churchgoing Catholic in 
his private life, Kennedy “had no intention of taking ecclesiastical 
authority seriously when exercising the functions of office”. As can 
be expected, this approach has been decried by its opponents as 
“godless” (English, 2007:150).  
The problem of religion in/and education also takes the form of a 
tension between the private and the public lives of citizens. Some 
regard a separation of these two domains as advisable for bridging 
the gaps in the cultural (including religious) diversity in public life. 
Their opponents reject this approach based on the argument that 
such separation is nothing less than a form of anthropological 
dualism. It compromises the inherent unity and integrity of learners 
as human beings. 
The problem can also take the form of a tension between the 
fundamental right of parents as the primary educators of their 
children to inculcate in them a particular religion/faith (Høstmae-
lingen, 2005:408; Hagesaether & Sandsmark, 2006:284) and to 
expect the school to do the same, and the right of the school as a 
public institution not to teach a particular form of religion or faith, but 
rather to inform its future citizens about all the religions prevalent in 
their particular community or state. This is the in loco parentis 
problem. Some interpret this phrase to mean literally that the school 
should take the place of the parents, to continue the work of the 
parental home, also as far as religious education is concerned. 
Others understand the phrase only to mean that school teachers 
should care for the children as if they were the parents of the child. 
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However, a school or the teachers can never completely replace the 
parents (cf. Van der Walt & Oosthuizen, 1998 for an analysis of this 
phrase).  
The problem is also connected to the fundamental rights of citizens. 
Does a citizen’s constitutional right to freedom of speech, religion, 
opinion and association also extend to insistence on religious 
instruction, to education in a particular faith, in public schools? Or 
would the inclusion of such a subject constitute a violation of the 
fundamental rights of others? Hagesaether and Sandmark’s (2006) 
recent empirical study covers both sides of this problem. 
In their study in Norway in 2000, 31% of the parents interviewed (all 
of them churchgoing Christians) said that they were not happy with 
the general religion education course offered in the public schools. 
They wanted the school to convey to the children that what they 
learnt at home was right and true. The more religiously active pa-
rents were more insistent than the passive ones that the school 
should confirm the religion taught at home (Hagesaether & Sands-
mark, 2006:279, 282). In 2002 the Norwegian Parliament introduced 
a compulsory subject to give learners a common basis of know-
ledge, culture and values and to promote understanding, respect 
and dialogue between adherents of different faiths and worldviews. 
The Parliament also withdrew the right of learners to be exempt from 
the subject, a step which elicited questions about whether the funda-
mental rights of parents and learners (parental say and freedom of 
thought and religion) were not being violated (Hagesaether & 
Sandsmark, 2006:283). Some of the parents who objected to having 
been denied the right to withdraw, took their case to court. After 
having lost their case in Norway, the parents of four pupils appealed 
to the United Nations’ Human Rights Committee in 2003. In 2004 
the Commission passed a verdict in favour of the appellants, in the 
process referring to Article 18.4 of the United Nations International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which “permits public school 
instruction in subjects such as the general history of religions and 
ethics if it is given in a neutral and objective way” and that  
… public education that includes instruction in a particular 
religion or belief is inconsistent with article 18, paragraph 4, 
unless provision is made for non-discriminatory exemptions or 
alternatives that would accommodate the wishes of parents or 
guardians.  
As a result of this verdict, the Norwegian Education Act was amen-
ded in 2005 to include the right of withdrawal from classes in religion 
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education and to receive alternative teaching (Hagesaether & 
Sandsmark, 2006:284; cf. also Høstmaelingen, 2005 for a discus-
sion of the Leirvåg et al v. Norway case of 3 November 2004). 
Others argue that confessional religious education in a public or 
state school would constitute a violation of the rights of learners not 
belonging to that particular faith, because of its restrictive and 
exclusive nature. There are compelling reasons for the claim that 
every learner should know and understand the cultural and religious 
heritage of their nation and particular community. Children, there-
fore, have the right to a religion education that would develop their 
understanding and respect for both their own religion as well as 
those of others, and thus become prepared for responsible citizen-
ship. According to Hagesaether and Sandsmark (2006:285), “it is 
hardly possible to use human rights arguments against such know-
ledge and understanding”. 
As both Hagesaether and Sandsmark (2006), and Høstmaelingen 
(2005) conclude, it is difficult to resolve this problem in terms of 
human rights theory. The problem of conflicting interests can hardly 
be eradicated by following this route. 
The problem also sometimes takes the form of a conflation of 
religious institutional ideals and school education. This approach 
finds expression in church (etc.) schools. The phenomenon of 
church (etc.) schools sits awkwardly with the principle of sphere 
sovereignty: the church (etc.) encroaching on the sovereignty of the 
school as a separate and independent societal relationship. 
Some base their plea for only providing religion education in schools 
on the argument that “it would be healthy if religious people 
regarded all the major religions as manifestations of one God”. This 
will in their opinion facilitate the teaching of tolerance which is so 
vital for the future of mankind (Martin, 2007:390; cf. also the United 
Nations’ Earth Charter, 2000). Their opponents reject this view, 
because they believe that only their religion has the one true God. 
4. Why have (most of) these strategies failed? 
Why is it so difficult to find an acceptable solution? In my opinion, 
the failure of current strategies can be ascribed to their essentially 
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incorrect approach to the universal-particular1 continuum (cf. Smol-
lett, 2002). Those who favour the exclusion of all forms of religion 
education from schools, because they feel that to do so would be 
advantageous for a common citizenship, as well as those who 
favour only the admission of religion education and religious 
observances, seem to drift towards the universal pole of the 
continuum. Their theories tend to emphasise the generic, common, 
universal aspects of society as well as the generic, common and 
universal aspects of religion as a phenomenon. 
On the other hand, those who argue for the inclusion of religious 
instruction (education in/of a particular religion), even to the extent of 
excluding all other forms of religion as well as religion education, 
seem to drift towards the opposite extreme of the continuum, i.e. the 
particular. In renouncing the teaching of universal, general, generic 
religion education, they find themselves in the company of 
philosophers who question the existence of universals. 
Some argue, for instance, that granting ontological status to univer-
sals (in this case, the universal characteristics that all religions 
supposedly share) is to resort to Platonic realism. Platonic realism 
holds that universals exist in a supra-natural idea(l) world, in a 
Platonic “heaven” separate from our spatiotemporal world, indepen-
dent of particulars (universalia ante rem). Universals may instantiate 
particulars, or they may not (Smollett, 2002). Universalism should be 
rejected, they say, in favour of empiricism, pragmatism and utilita-
rianism. There is no need for Platonic universals and rationalism as 
foundations (normative or foundational resources) for our social 
decisions, such as whether religion should be taught in schools or 
not. Decisions should rather be based on empirical, non-metaphy-
sical, common sense, pragmatic, utilitarian arguments and experi-
mental open-mindedness (cf. Rorty, 2000:79; 2004:54). Rortyan 
pragmatists and utilitarians therefore abandon any striving after 
certain knowledge, grounded facts and objective truth, and accept 
that concepts of truth and rationality do not reveal participation in 
universal human nature, but rather in association with a specific 
community which is the heir of a specific tradition. Instead of re-
                                      
1 The universal pole finds expression in terms such as unity, commonality, 
generic, general, global, uniformity, a single idea applicable to all instances in 
the same way, a general idea, and the particular pole in terms such as diversity, 
contingency, locality, specificity, individuality, difference(s), variation, variants, 
variety, relativism, thing in itself, a thing apart from others (cf. also Van Niekerk, 
2005:28-29; Woolfenden, 2008; Knight, 2008; Jansen, 2008). 
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sorting to universal notions of truth, the pragmatist does what is 
deemed apposite in the given circumstances in a particular com-
munity (Van Niekerk, 2005:22). This form of pragmatism should also 
apply in policy making with respect to religion in/and schools. The 
important thing to note here is the preference for the particular pole 
of the continuum – to the detriment of the universal. 
Nominalists likewise, have no need for universals. Nominalism does 
not depend on whether a thing that is referred to is instantiable or 
not (Smollett, 2002). What we refer to as a “universal” is merely the 
nomen (name) of something that actually exists. Universals, there-
fore, have no ontic status; they are just the names or labels given to 
describe and categorise collections of particulars. In terms of this 
argument, the universal known as “religion” is just a name tag for a 
category of phenomena. Conceptualists go one step further than 
nominalists. They hold that universals are not only name tags, but 
also that they exist only in the minds of people (MacLeod & 
Rubenstein, 2006) (universalia post rem). 
Aristotelian realists recognise the existence of universals, but be-
lieve that they exist only in the one-realm spatiotemporal world of 
particulars and not in a separate metaphysical Platonic “heaven” 
(Smollett, 2002; Woolfenden, 2008:3) (universalia in re). “White-
ness”, therefore, exists only in a particular thing, such as a horse. A 
universal of which a practical instance cannot be provided, an un-
instantiated universal, therefore, does not exist or must be fictitious 
or hypothetical (Woolfenden, 2008:5, 6). Since no actual instance of 
a unicorn has been discovered so far, unicorns probably do not 
exist. By the same token, if a religious tenet cannot be instantiated 
in the form of a particular precept or dogma, it can be assumed not 
to exist. It therefore makes little sense to teach universal religious 
tenets to children. Religious tenets only come to life once they are 
actually instantiated. In terms of this argument, learners should be 
taught the tenets of an actual religion, in its confessional, sectarian 
form.  
This particularist argument can be summarily countered with the 
universalist retort that to teach all the different sectarian forms of 
religion in schools would be impracticable, that it would be more 
practical to teach only the “universal form”, instantiable or not. It 
would be impractical to provide several teachers in each school, one 
for each of the religions represented in the learner population. One 
teacher will not be up to the task of teaching all the religions, mainly 
because of him-/herself belonging to a particular religion and 
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therefore likely to be biased towards learners adhering to other 
religions. 
Is there a way out of this quandary?  
5. A possible way out of the religion in/and education 
quandary 
My thesis is that it is difficult if not quite impossible for the policy-
makers of an entire school system to find the necessary equilibrium 
on the above-mentioned continuum on behalf of each individual 
school in the system. A glance at the work of MacLeod and Ruben-
stein (2006), Brown (quoted in Woolfenden, 2008) and Thiessen 
(quoted in Jansen, 2008) shows that this is a notoriously difficult 
task that has been keeping philosophers and educationists busy for 
many centuries.  
As we have seen, tendencies of drifting to either of the extremities of 
the universal-particular continuum do not provide a solution. The 
shortcoming so far, as I see it, has been that policy-makers have 
been focusing on religion and on the school system rather than on 
the particular school in which religion has to be taught or not. There 
is just no way that national, state or provincial policy-makers can 
formulate policy about the teaching of religion that would satisfy the 
needs of each and every local school community, including the pa-
rents and the learners. Policy-makers, therefore, need to shift their 
attention to individual local schools and their institutional identities.  
The key to the problem can be found in what I, in following Bakker 
(2002:101), De Wolff et al. (2003:208; 2002:239-240), shall refer to 
as the institutional identity of a school. This term is broadly synony-
mous with institutional ethos. Ethos, according to Sinclair (1999: 
489), refers to the distinctive character, spirit and attitudes of a parti-
cular group or organisation, in this case a school (community). It em-
braces the philosophy, life-view and value system of the particular 
school (Plug et al., 2007:98) as well as the concomitant set of be-
liefs, ideas and conceptions about social behaviour and relation-
ships of the institution or group (Procter, 2002:470).  
Institutional identity refers to those dynamic characteristics which 
make a school what it is at a given point in time. It refers to those 
typical characteristics or features that make this particular school 
unique, that the stakeholders in the school share with one another 
(also as a collective) and that endure for a time. According to Bakker 
and Rigg (2004:14), this definition draws our attention to an actual 
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school: this specific school (not schools in general), with these 
teachers and learners in this specific context. Extra-school con-
ditions and contexts, for instance the Christian-reformational school 
tradition, also impact on a school’s institutional identity. Identity is 
contingent on the particularities of local time and place. The 
important thing to note is, however, that each particular school 
shapes such ideas and influences to form its own unique institutional 
identity. In doing this, we take the particular pole of the continuum as 
point of departure. 
In contrast to the Dutch education system where a group of schools 
with the same or similar life-conceptual institutional identity clusters 
together in a so-called pillar (Sturm et al., 1998), policy-makers/the 
education system should allow each and every school, whether 
state/public or private/independent, the freedom of determining for 
itself its own institutional identity. All the stakeholders in a particular 
school should convene and decide for themselves what the identity 
of their particular school in fact is, or think it should be.  
The next step is for them to decide where they wish to position their 
school on the universal-particular continuum. This, in my opinion is 
the only way of ensuring true equilibrium.  
The final step is for the school (community) to formulate its institu-
tional identity in its vision and mission statement and to proclaim its 
identity to the surrounding community. This will enable parents and 
learners to decide whether they can or should associate themselves 
with the school or not. 
Why is this an appropriate solution to the problem of religion in/and 
education? 
In the first place, it is democracy at work where it matters most – at 
the local level. Only the stakeholders actually involved in a particular 
school determine its institutional identity. Formulation of the institu-
tional identity is an expression of their democratic will. Because all 
schools enjoy exactly the same freedom to determine their re-
spective institutional identities and all are equally and equitably 
financed by the state, they can all contribute on an even footing to 
the human and social capital of their particular communities, and 
also of the state. 
Secondly, involving only direct stakeholders in the local life of a 
school in determining the school’s institutional identity would prevent 
the state, the churches (etc.) and other institutions from infringing on 
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the sphere sovereignty of the school. No other societal relationship 
can be as responsive to the religious (education) needs of a school 
as its own stakeholders. The stake of the state/education depart-
ment will be restricted to funding and determining the formal para-
meters for schools and schooling (Flitner, 2006:184). Governments 
sometimes contend that their financing of a school entitles them to a 
say in determining the school’s institutional identity (cf. Samsom, 
1981). However, state/government say in this impinges upon the 
sphere sovereignty of the school as a societal relationship that is 
clearly distinguishable and in principle independent from the state or 
government. Flitner (2006:181) correctly speaks of the school as 
“eine eigene Einrichtung”, i.e. an organisation or societal relationship 
that is independent from both family home and the state, despite 
their having stakes in the school. 
The proposed approach furthermore amounts to a system of “pri-
vate” or “independent” schools within the state-funded system. All 
schools in the system are equitably funded by the state, on condition 
that they meet certain requirements, one of which should be that a 
school must have proclaimed its institutional identity. Put differently, 
each school can express its uniqueness (which is a reference to the 
particular pole of the continuum) and also the extent to which it 
shares its vision and mission with other schools (the universal pole). 
Private schools will become obsolete. In the proposed system, all 
schools will be state schools, funded with public tax money (the uni-
versal pole). They will at the same time all be private or independent 
in the sense of each having the freedom to determine their own 
unique institutional identities (the particular pole). 
Another problem will have been circumvented: all three forms of 
educating (about) religion (i.e. confessional religious instruction, 
academic religion education and religious observances) can in prin-
ciple find a place in each school, because the religion(s) selected by 
the school administrators, the parents and the learners will be in line 
with the school’s proclaimed institutional identity. This will eliminate 
all current threats to the ontological and anthropological integrity of 
the schools and the learners.  
The main advantage of this proposal is that each school would enjoy 
the liberty of deciding for itself whether it wishes to gravitate towards 
the universal pole, to the opposite extreme or to the more balanced 
middle of the continuum. A school’s policies will be dictated by its 
local circumstances, including the religious composition of the 
particular community. 
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The proposed system will furthermore allow parents and learners to 
join those schools of which the identities resonate best with their 
own religious and faith convictions. Where the choice of schools is 
inadequate, as in small communities, parents could send their 
children to neighbouring schools (with state aid for transport and/or 
accommodation). The obvious solution for a small community, how-
ever, would be to define the institutional identity of the school in 
such terms that all the religions prevalent in that community can be 
accommodated (a strategy supported by Hagesaether & Sands-
mark, 2006:286, and mentioned as a route for states to take by 
Høstmaelingen, 2005:407). This might of course also mean a deci-
sion that all forms of education about religion should be avoided, or 
that all of them should be offered in the school, among others, by 
providing a religious education teacher for each of the religious 
denominations (with state and/or parental subsidies which, as ar-
gued above, would not be the most practical solution). This problem 
would understandably be non-existent in large communities; parents 
and learners will have a sufficiently wide choice of schools. 
6. Concluding remark 
The proposed system of having private or independent schools 
within the state or public funded system meets all the societal rela-
tionship requirements, such as sphere sovereignty, as well as impor-
tant ontological and anthropological requirements such as striking a 
balance on the universal-particular continuum. Implementation of the 
new system requires from policy-makers to henceforth shift their 
focus from guidelines for the entire education system to the needs 
and requirements of each individual school in the system. 
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